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Home -> Finance -> Full Story
The Story of Cancun (II)–As told by Arun Jaitley
By Arun Jaitley
Monday, October 6 2003 18:48 Hrs (IST)

(This is the second and last of a two-part series, the first of which was carried yesterday)

During the Conference, I had an occasion to meet a number of Ministers of developing countries as well as developed countries, including the US and the EC. We were very active in the deliberations of the G- 21 (which later became G-22 with the inclusion of Indonesia) and most of its meetings were held in the conference room of the India delegation at our hotel.

Similarly, we were in close contact with other developing countries on the Singapore Issues. On agriculture, there were several discussions between the G-21 and the Facilitator as also with the US and the EC. On Singapore Issues, there was no doubt at all at any point of time that the vast majority of countries were against negotiation of the four issues. This included the LDC Group, the ACP Group and the Africa Group as well as many others like India, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines In fact, there must have been at least a hundred countries opposed to the commencement of negotiations on the Singapore Issues.

When I met the Facilitator for Singapore Issues, Minister Pettigrew of Canada, I told him that his task was possibly the easiest of all. The Doha Declaration had called for explicit consensus on the modalities for negotiations to take place. He had only to report that there was no explicit consensus on any of the issues.

When the revised Chairman's text came on Saturday, 13 August, however, we were taken aback. Our concerns on agriculture had been sidelined. On the Singapore Issues, negotiation was to begin on three of the four issues, investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement. Softer language was, however, used in respect of competition, clearly because the US had reservations on this issue.

On cotton subsidies, the question of correction of distortions was totally bypassed and instead a study was to be started on the entire textile area, including manmade fibres and synthetics, a strange kind of a decision in a year that should see the end of the quota system now prevailing in some of the developed countries. There was a meeting of Heads of Delegations later in the evening on August 13, which stretched out well past midnight. One after the other, developing countries came forward to strongly express their resentment in no uncertain terms. The accusation has been made by some prominent trading partner of ours that the atmosphere at the meeting of Heads of Delegations was emotionally surcharged and that the statements made were much too strong. I am sure that all would recognise the fact that the intensity of the reaction on issues that have social, economic and political repercussions affecting millions of people would be directly proportional to the extent of the provocation.

At the Green Room meeting next day, there were about 30 countries present. It would not be proper on my part to disclose what happened in the Green Room and who said what but I have seen some pretty accurate reports in newspapers and magazines of what transpired there.

It is, however, common knowledge today that the Singapore Issues were taken up for consideration first and that one of the main protagonists of these issues, the EC, were willing to drop further work on two of the four issues, investment and competition, and that, of the remaining two, strong differences continued to persist on transparency in government procurement.

At this stage, I was optimistic about a result and felt that, with a few more hours of work, tangible progress on agriculture and development and some more deliberation on what remained of the Singapore Issues, we may actually strike a deal at Cancun. At this time, however, to the surprise of most of us present in the Green Room, the Chairman suddenly decided to terminate the Ministerial Conference without taking up the other key issues, as, indeed, one of the Ministers had suggested.

The abrupt closure of the meeting has led to much speculation and many unanswered questions. The Chairman of the Ministerial Conference, a wise and astute political leader with many years of experience in the economic field and trade, obviously had, on the basis of inputs received by him from various sources, come to the definite conclusion that no further progress was achievable. Our reading of the situation was totally different. Our expectation was that a positive outcome was not far and that some more work and effort would have yielded results. It would be counter-productive at this stage to conduct a post-mortem of the events in the Green Room on the 14th or to impute motives or indulge in conjecture. We do not want to further vitiate the atmosphere.

It is now for us to pick up the pieces and try to achieve results by December when the General Council meeting is scheduled to be held. This would require commitment and dedication on the part of all Members. While there may have been no perceptible positive outcome at Cancun, I am of the view that progress has nevertheless been made.

There has been forward movement on agriculture and on Singapore Issues. There is a greater level of understanding of each other's concerns and sensitivities. It is important that we continue with this exercise, focusing on issues and not allowing ourselves to be deflected to other areas. We hear nowadays some voice being raised regarding deficiencies in the decision-making system of the WTO. I cannot understand this.

The Uruguay Round negotiations had clearly laid down a process for decision-making in Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. If consensus is not achievable, there is clearly the option of majority voting which could be adopted to take decisions. This is a modern system based on Democratic traditions. Any change in this method of decision-making would in effect amount to changing the basic character of the constitution of the WTO, which would have far-reaching implications on the structure of the organisation and would call in question some of the Agreements themselves, such as the TRIPS Agreement about which controversy persists.

We would also do well not to point accusing fingers at each other. It is wholly simplistic to categorise the membership of the WTO into the "good guys", who agree with whatever we say, and the "bad guys", who hold different views. We need to listen to one another, appreciate the concerns of all and find solutions that are multilaterally acceptable and that adhere to the Doha mandate.

The Doha Ministerial Declaration had stated that "the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference will take stock of progress in the negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance, and take decisions as necessary". I sensed that there were some areas of convergence on certain issues and some other areas of emerging convergence.

There were some issues on which further negotiation and discussion was required. If we had put together an honest appraisal of the areas of convergence and the areas of divergence and avoided the temptation to force certain decisions on an unwilling majority, we would have had a Ministerial Text which could have formed the basis of productive future works. We lost an opportunity at Cancun but this should not deter us from working determinedly towards achievement of the goal we set out at Doha to finish the negotiations by 1 January, 2005.

Cancun has proved the point that it is necessary to revive and revitalise the Geneva process. The bulk of the negotiations would need to be done at the technical level in Geneva. It is incumbent on all of us to provide the necessary flexibility to our negotiators to move forward boldly. It is important also for the Director General to move decisively to restore the status of the Secretariat as an objective and efficient adjunct to the negotiations. Dr Supachai is a man of many parts. He is a top political leader in his own country, an administrator of note, a banker, an economist, even a highly talented chess player. There could be no one better than him to analyse what needs to be done to make the Secretariat a credible and effective institution. He needs to move fast.

Perhaps it is he who will breathe new life into the Doha Work Programme and at the same time redesign the Secretariat so that it regains the trust and confidence of all Members, particularly developing country Members.

From India's point of view, we are firmly of the opinion that a fair, rules-based multilateral trading system is absolutely essential to ensure all-round global development. We also believe equally strongly that the Doha Work Programme gives us a unique opportunity to make the changes that are needed to conduct trade and economic relations "with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services....'', as the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement puts it. We need to work together shoulder to shoulder to build a system that benefits all.

PTI

The Story of Cancun-As told by Arun Jaitley